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NOTES
U.C.C. SECTION 2-403: A REFORM IN NEED OF REFORM
The classic common law triangle occurred whenever 0 (an inno-
cent chattel owner) yielded up possession to A (a wrongdoer), who
then sold the property to B (an innocent purchaser).' A, of course,
always disappeared, leaving 0 and B each insisting on his good faith
and each demanding that the other bear the loss. How the common
law dealt with the respective parties differed according to the nature
of the original transaction. At one end of the spectrum, A always
acquired good, transferable title to the goods if he had given value.
At the other extreme, A acquired no title and could transfer none
to a subsequent purchaser if he had stolen the goods from 0. Be-
tween these two extremes the common law developed a series of
bewildering rules and exceptions, ostensibly based on O's intent in
the original transaction.
These intermediate cases spawned a confusing body of law. For
example, if A obtained possession and title from 0 through fraudu-
lent impersonation, although A had no right to retain possession or
title as against 0, A was granted the power at common law to
transfer good title to B. Conversely, A received no title and could
transfer none if he obtained possession of the goods in exchange for
a bad check. B's claim of good title also depended on whether O's
voluntary relinquishment of possession was induced by impersona-
tion in a face-to-face transaction, by mail, by a fraudulent agent,
or by fraud recognized as larcenous under the criminal law. Ad-
ditionally, if 0 voluntarily entrusted goods to A as his agent or
employee and misled the public into believing that A owned the
goods, then the law estopped 0 from denying B's title to the goods
as a good faith purchaser for value who relied on O's acts of misre-
presentation.
Because they were based on O's supposed intent, these rules gov-
erning the transfer of title in the intermediate cases produced a
1. This Note refers to the parties involved as original owner, wrongdoer, and purchaser.
An original owner or owner is the individual who held title to the chattel initially. A wrong-
doer is the party who acquired possession of the chattel through the perpetration of some
fraudulent or otherwise wrongful act. A purchaser is the transferee who obtained possession
of the goods from the wrongdoer.
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perplexing and arbitrary array of results from B's perspective. In
1952, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code inserted section
2-4032 into this confusing intermediate area. Although in retrospect
their purpose is not entirely clear, it probably was limited to clarify-
ing only a few specific cases that were troublesome under the com-
mon law, rather than to treat the entire intermediate area.
Section 2-403 directly addresses two situations that were trouble-
some under prior law. Questions of voidable title fall within section
2-403(1); the entrusting situation is governed by section 2-403(2).
The Code, however, fails to explore either situation in depth; there-
fore, serious problems remain. For example, the Code neglects to
define voidable title, although the syntax of section 2-403(1) im-
pliedly rejects the common law definition. 3 In addition, the lan-
guage of section 2-403 can be read by courts either as endorsing
drastic and far-reaching change in the existing law or as preserving
the status quo. The comments to the section provide little guidance
for interpretation.4 More importantly, the language governing en-
trustments is so broad that it covers some voidable title problems,
thus further obscuring the intent of the drafters.
This Note attempts to clarify the existing law and to provide a
focus for the future law of transfer of title by examining the roots
and analyzing the content of section 2-403. Ways to reach results
that are most in accord with the general policies of the Uniform
Commercial Code also are suggested.
COMMON LAW HISTORY
General Background
The common law of transfer of title was governed for many years
by the general rule that no one could convey better title than he
himself had.' This maxim is reflected in a broad range of transfer-
2. See text accompanying notes 153, 159, 176 & 179 infra.
3. See notes 160-64 infra & accompanying text.
4. The drafters explained their purpose in changing § 2-403 as "[tlo gather together a
series of prior uniform statutory provisions and the case-law thereunder and to state a unified
and simplified policy on good faith purchase of goods." U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment.
5. This concept is rooted firmly in classical Roman law, which provided for absolute owner-
ship limited only by the very narrow exception of the bona fide possessor with a titulus (title).
W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 67-68 (2d ed. 1965). A mere bailee
could never transfer indefeasible ownership. Id. at 130. In addition, the requirement of a strict
ceremony of traditio (delivery), id. at 110-12, and the rule that ownership would not pass until
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of-title cases in which courts looked to the owner's intent and the
circumstances surrounding his initial loss of possession to resolve
the controversy.' When a case involved theft, for example, and thus
the original owner clearly did not intend to transfer possession,
courts held that the thief never acquired the power to transfer any
more than a void title.7 This result furthered the policy of protecting
the property rights of "true" owners by ensuring that no subsequent
the buyer both had accepted delivery and paid the full purchase price, F. DEZULUETA, THE
ROMAN LAW OF SALES 52-53 (1945), further protected the interests of the original owner.
Conversely, the French Civil Code, although chiefly based on Roman law, rejects the
wholesale protection of the original owner in favor of the purchaser. Discarding the ownership-
title dichotomy, it adopts instead the rule that "[i]n matters of personalty, possession is
equivalent to title." C. Civ. art. 2279 (Fr.). In an apparent attempt to pacify disgruntled
owners, French law permits the original owner of a lost or stolen chattel to bring an action
for recovery against the possessor within three years of the loss or theft. Id. This provision,
however, is virtually nullified by the protection bestowed on purchasers who buy at a "fair
or at a market or at a public sale, or from a merchant selling similar things." Id. art. 2280.
The original owner can regain possession of the chattel from such a purchaser only by reim-
bursing the purchase price to the possessor. Id.
Although intellectually tantalizing, most speculation as to the rationale behind the radi-
cally different approaches to the philosophy of title in Roman and French law has proved
fruitless. See generally Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisted: A Comparative Inquiry,
42 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1962); Note, The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A
Critique of Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207-09 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Hickey v. McDonald Bros., 151 Ala. 497, 44 So. 201 (1907) (intent to transfer
title to impersonator); John N. Sims & Sons v. Bolton, 138 Ga. 73, 74 S.E. 770 (1912) (no
intent to transfer title until cash payment received); Alexander v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81,
4 N.E. 433 (1886) (no intent to pass title to a pretended agent); Perkins v. Anderson, 65 Iowa
398, 21 N.W. 696 (1884) (intent to transfer title to impersonator); Newberry v. Norfolk & S.
Ry., 133 N.C. 45, 45 S.E. 356 (1903) (no intent to transfer title to impersonator operating
through the mails); Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427 (1872) (no intent to transfer to a pretended
agent).
In cases such as these, in which the owner sued to recover goods from the third-party
purchaser, the courts generally presumed that, for one reason or another, the owner did not
intend to pass title. In contrast, in cases in which the goods were destroyed or lost and the
owner sued to recover the price of the goods from the transferee, the courts generally found
that the owner intended title to pass immediately. The common law placed the risk of loss
on the individual who held title to the goods; therefore, the courts, in effect, brazenly manipu-
lated the supposed owner-intent analysis in determining the passage of title according to
whether the goods were destroyed in order to grant absolute protection to the original owner.
Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly, 62
YALE L.J. 101, 104-05 & n.24 (1952) [hereinafter cited as The "Cash Sale" Presumption].
See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.2 (3d ed. 1975).
7. E.g., Boulden v. Gough, 20 Del. (4 Penne.) 48, 54 A. 693 (Super. Ct. 1902) (tenant stole
wheat and sold to good faith purchaser); Tuttle v. White, 46 Mich. 485, 9 N.W. 528 (1881)
(thief cut down logs and sold them to a good faith purchaser); Godwin v. Taenzer, 122 Tenn.
101, 119 S.W. 1133 (1909) (thief sold stolen timber to a good faith purchaser); Turnbow v.
Beckstead, 25 Utah 468, 71 P. 1062 (1903) (lessee sold leased sheep to a good faith purchaser).
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transferee took good title from a thief.' It also upheld the common
law policy that he who made the wrong possible should bear the
loss.' Pursuant to this policy, a good faith purchaser was required
to ascertain the validity of his transferor's title before accepting
possession of the chattel on the assumption that any dereliction of
this duty enabled the wrongful transfer to take place. This rule
protected the owner's rights and forced the purchaser to bear the full
cost of his failure to discover the truth.'0
Although in theory the duties imposed to effectuate these policies
were justifiable, in practice they often led to inequitable results. In
Hessen v. Iowa Automobile Mutual Insurance Co.," for example,
the plaintiff purchased an automobile from a dealer and insured it
against theft. When the car was stolen from the plaintiff and he
attempted to recover the insurance proceeds, the company refused
to pay.'2 The company argued that Hessen acquired neither a good
title nor an insurable interest from the dealer because the automo-
bile had been stolen from its original owner.' 3 Meanwhile, the car
dealer went out of business.'4 In a decision ostensibly based on the
policies of protecting the rightful owner and deterring negligence
on the part of the vendee, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a
good faith purchaser of a stolen automobile obtained no title and,
thus, no insurable interest. 5
8. See generally Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1950).
9. The rule is stated more eloquently in BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMs 463 (9th ed. 1911):
"Whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled
such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it." This rule has been criticized fre-
quently as allowing excessive judicial discretion. E.g., Warren, Cutting off Claims of Owner-
ship under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 482 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 315 (1882), in which the court warned, "If it were
otherwise, people would not be secure in sending their watches or articles of jewelry to a
jeweller's establishment to be repaired, or cloth to a clothing establishment to be made into
garments." See also W. STORY, SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 155-56 (1847).
11. 195 Iowa 141, 190 N.W. 150 (1922).
12. Id. at 142, 190 N.W. at 151.
13. Id.; see A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 164 (2d ed. 1969), for an
interesting discussion of the initial whereabouts of the automobile in dispute.
14. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 13, at 165.
15. 195 Iowa at 142, 190 N.W. at 151. The requirement that an insured have and retain an
insurable interest in the thing insured is designed to satisfy several objectives. First, it
guarantees that insurance companies will not violate local gambling statutes. Id. Second, the
requirement gives the insured a reason to take care of the property, thus reducing the chance
of insurance fraud. Finally, it provides the insurance company with a worthwhile right of
[Vol. 20:513
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Arguably, this decision did not enhance significantly the protec-
tion of the original owner's interests. The dispute involved only an
insured's right to recover from his insurer; it did not concern the
owner's title at all. Thus, Hessen's rights and immunities in relation
to those of the true owner were not at issue, and the policy of pro-
tecting the original owner's interests was irrelevant. At worst, the
court's decision impaired the interests of original owners by discour-
aging purchasers from insuring cars if, as can be argued, owners
could recover more easily from good faith purchasers who insured
the property they purchased against theft.'" The court more sensibly
might have examined the interest the purchaser clearly had in pro-
tecting his possession of the automobile against subsequent theft.
The court also failed in its second goal, to deter negligent conduct
on the part of the vendee on the principle that "[iut is the duty of
a vendee to determine whether he is securing good title to the thing
purchased, and if title fails and loss ensues, the purchaser must look
to his vendor."' 7 In many respects, this policy, as applied in Hessen,
led to an injust result. First, Hessen, who could neither read nor
write English,"5 was less able to protect himself than the insurance
company, which presumably had records of automobile serial num-
bers and reports of stolen vehicles.'9 Second, by purchasing the car
from a commercial dealer, the plaintiff took all the precautions a
reasonable buyer could to assure his good title and ownership. 0 In
subrogation to any claims of the insured. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 13, at 163 n.2.
See generally PFEIFFER, PERSPECTIVES ON INSURANCE (1974).
16. See A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 13, at 163 n.2.
17. 195 Iowa at 143, 190 N.W. at 152. But see Creseort Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa
1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941) (owner who sold car to dealer and delivered possession and title
estopped as against good faith purchaser). Justice Story expressed the more typical attitude
of the courts toward the good faith purchaser: "[H]is loss is often the result of his negligence
and want of scrutiny." W. STORY, supra note 10, at 156. But see Goddard Grocer Co. v.
Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939). See generally L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF SALES § 30 (2d ed. 1959); 17 U. BUFFALO L. REV. 865 (1968).
18. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 13, at 165.
19. Id. at 165-66. Professors Casner and Leach relate that automobile manufacturers pro-
vide lists of serial numbers, engine numbers, and corresponding manufacturing dates to any
interested party, including insurance companies, which regularly check these lists to see if
the insured property is described correctly. The authors also hint at fraudulent collusion
between Hessen's vendor, the car dealer, and the insurance company. Id. If not fraudulent,
the insurance company's actions were sufficiently negligent to have raised an estoppel.
20. See, e.g., Kearby v. Western States Sec. Co., 31 Ariz. 104, 250 P. 766 (1926) (buyer
who purchased car from dealer did all he could to assure title of his vendor and thus prevailed
against titleholder); Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953)
1979]
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penalizing Hessen despite his diligence, the court failed to promote
its avowed policy of encouraging vendees to exercise reasonable care
in sales transactions. Finally, the court's passing reference to the
purchaser's remedy against his vendor was meaningless because the
dealer already had gone out of business. 2'
Hence, what at first appeared to be a logical application of a
sensible principle ultimately produced an inequitable result that
failed to advance the court's stated policies. By mechanically apply-
ing the principle of caveat emptor, the court allocated risk in favor
of the insurer, despite the insurer's superior ability to protect
against and spread the risk of loss. The fact situation in Hessen, a
variation on the owner-vendee controversy, pitted an innocent con-
sumer against a knowledgeable insurance company. Thus, auto-
matic application of the caveat emptor principle was especially un-
just.2 2 Nonetheless, even in the typical owner-thief-vendee case,
such a mechanical disposition is subject to the same criticism as the
Hessen decision for its failure to consider the relative equities. For
example, the typical consumer vendee usually is unable to protect
himself either by a careful scrutiny of the thief's purported title or
through the purchase of high-cost title insurance. In contrast, the
commercial owner often is in a superior position both to protect
himself against theft through the use of sophisticated security de-
vices2 and to spread the risk of loss by incorporating the price of
theft insurance into his cost of doing business. 24 Of course, not all
(buyer who purchased a diamond ring from jeweler did all he could to assure title of his vendor
and thus prevailed against the original owner).
21. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 13, at 165.
22. In fact, other courts in similar situations recognized the injustice of this result and held
that the purchaser whose title was good against all the world except the original owner had
an insurable interest. See, e.g., Savarese v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1 N.J. Misc. 315, 123 A.
763 (1924); Barnett v. London Assur. Corp., 138 Wash. 673, 245 P. 3 (1926).
23. Swartz, discussing the rights of the good faith purchaser under the laws of several
nations, commented,
It is recognized that it is most impractical to expect that a man who knowingly
parts with his goods should have to investigate the party with whom he is
dealing, but is it more impractical than expecting that the BFP be compelled
to investigate the title of his vendor? The latter in this day of rapid circulation
and transfer of property is virtually impossible, but there might be some basis
for the former in that it would compel the owner of goods to be, at least, a bit
more careful to whom he entrusts his goods.
Swartz, supra note 5, at 411. See also The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 105-
06.
24. For a discussion of this argument within the context of the cash-sale bad-check cases,
[Vol. 20:513
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owners are merchants, and not all vendees are ordinary consumers.
This approach, therefore, required considerable analysis of the com-
peting equities. In applying the common law, however, courts gener-
ally did not engage in such analysis but simply denied title to any
transferee who purchased from a thief, regardless of how unjust the
result.25 Typically, they resolved controversies involving a thief-
vendor by simply reciting the maxim that no one could transfer
better title than he himself had and by applying the principle of
caveat emptor to the purchaser.2 6 This mechanical application of
rigid rules to complex and equivocal fact situations led eventually
to the series of exceptions, supported by strained analyses, that
defined the intermediate areas of the common law of voidable title.
Voidable Title: The Impersonation Cases
The rules and exceptions for impersonation cases formed one por-
tion of this intermediate area. The wrongdoer who obtained posses-
sion through fraudulent impersonation sometimes was able to trans-
fer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. His power to do
so depended on a forced analysis of what the original owner intended
when he gave up possession; in turn, the owner's intent varied with
see The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 107.
25. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Handley Motor co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 325, 75 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1953)
("Title like a stream cannot rise higher than its source. The general rule is that a seller of
personal property without title cannot transfer a better title than he has, unless some princi-
ple of estoppel comes into operation.")
This holding followed the same general line as the Uniform Sales Act:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who
is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with
the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than
the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller's authority to sell.
(2) Nothing in this act, however, shall affect:
(a) the provisions of any factors' acts, recording acts or any enactment
enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the
true owner thereof.
(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale under any common law
or statutory power of sale or the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 23. See generally R. BROWN, supra note 6, § 9.3, and the cases cited
therein; 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 311 (rev. ed. 1948); see also Fawcett, Isham & Co. v. Osborn,
Adams & Co., 32 111. 411, 425 (1863) ("The general rule of law, sanctioned by common sense,
is that no man can, by his sale, transfer to another the right of ownership in a thing wherein
he himself had not the right of property."); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882) (bailee with
mere possession could not transfer any title).
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the type of impersonation perpetrated by the defrauder.27 In the
leading case of Phelps v. McQuade,2 the Court of Appeals of New
York used the owner-intent analysis to develop the spectrum of rules
that determined when a fraudulent impersonator acquired a voida-
ble, as opposed to a void, title.
The plaintiff in Phelps relinquished possession of jewelry in reli-
ance on the wrongdoer's fraudulent, face-to-fice impersonation of
wealthy businessman Baldwin J. Gwynne. Before Phelps realized
his mistake, the wrongdoer transferred possession to McQuade, a
good faith purchaser for value. 29 In resolving the ensuing controversy
between the original owner and the subsequent transferee, the court
first articulated the rule that if the original owner intended to trans-
fer title to the person with whom he dealt, then title passed regard-
less of whether the owner was deceived as to the person's identity.3"
Applying this rule to the facts, the court reasoned that because the
owner dealt personally with the wrongdoer in a face-to-face transac-
tion and, thus, had the opportunity to observe him, the owner fully
intended to transfer title to the person standing before him.' There-
fore, although Phelps also intended to transfer title to the wealthy
Baldwin J. Gwynne, the court decided that his primary intention
was to transfer to the person with whom he personally negotiated. 312
Hence, the fact that he was deceived was not determinative of his
intent, but the type of deception practiced was highly relevant to
such a finding.33
27. See L. VOLD, supra note 17, § 30. Professor Vold, id. at 398 n.6, cites from the Bible
for the earliest impersonation case, in which Jacob posed as his brother Esau in a successful
attempt to gain both his brother's and his share of their inheritance. See Genesis 27:1-35.
28. 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917).
29. Id. at 232, 115 N.E. at 441.
30. Id. at 235, 115 N.E. at 442. The court phrased the rule as follows:
Where the transaction is a personal one, the seller intends to transfer title to a
person of credit, and he supposes the one standing before him to be that person.
He is deceived. But in spite of that fact his primary intention is to sell his goods
to the person with whom he negotiates.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; accord, Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948);
Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 102 A. 977 (1918); Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Transp.
Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883).
33. 220 N.Y. 232, 235, 115 N.E. 441, 442 (1917). The court highlighted the importance of
the owner's intent in its determination of who held title: "Where the vendor of personal
property intends to sell his goods to the person with whom he deals, then title passes, even
though he be deceived as to that person's identity or responsibility. Otherwise it does not. It
is purely a question of the vendor's intention." Id. at 234, 115 N.E. at 442.
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The court, however, had difficulty distinguishing earlier decisions
involving different types of impersonation that held that the owner
did not intend to transfer title to an impersonator. In the early
English case of Cundy v. Lindsay,34 the wrongdoer, Blenkarn, repre-
sented to the plaintiffs by mail that he was Blenkiron & Co. Relying
on this false representation and knowing of the good reputation of
W. Blenkiron & Sons, the plaintiffs delivered property to the wrong-
doer at 37 Wood Street.35 Before they could ascertain that W. Blen-
kiron & Sons was actually located at 123 Wood Street, Blenkarn
sold the property to Cundy, a good faith purchaser for value, and
spent the proceeds. 3 The court held for the original owner, reason-
ing that no contract for the sale of goods could exist without a
meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.37 No meeting of
the minds occurred because the owner intended to contract with W.
Blenkiron & Sons, not Blenkarn. 31 No contract existed; therefore, no
title ever passed.39
Even though the holdings in Cundy and Phelps were clearly in-
consistent, the court in Phelps tried to distinguish the two cases on
their facts. If the impersonation was by mail, the owner intended
to transfer title to the person whose name appeared on the letter,
the court reasoned. 0 If, however, the impersonation occurred in the
course of a face-to-face transaction, the owner intended to deal with
the negotiator, even if he was deceived as to the impersonator's
identity.4' In making this distinction the court avoided the question
whether it was really so apparent that an owner intended to deal
with the person standing in front of him, but did not intend to deal
with the person transacting business by mail. The distinction was
illogical: if the owner never knew he was being deceived, he could
34. 3 App. Cas. 459 (H.L. 1878).
35. Id. at 460.
36. Id. Blenkarn later was prosecuted and convicted, leaving the two innocent parties
quarreling over who would bear the loss. Id.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id. at 465-66; accord, Moore v. Furstenwerth-UHL Jewelry Co., 17 Ga. App. 669, 87
S.E. 1097 (1916); Newberry v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 133 N.C. 45,45 S.E. 356 (1903). Seegenerally
R. BROWN, supra note 6, § 9.6; L. VOLD, supra note 17, § 30, at 399; 3 S. WLISTON, supra
note 26, § 635.
39. 3 App. Cas. at 465-66.
40. 220 N.Y. 232, 235, 115 N.E. 441, 442 (1917). Specifically, the court stated, "Where the
transaction is by letter the vendor intends to deal with the person whose name is signed to
the letter. He knows no one else. He supposes he is dealing with no one else." Id.
41. Id.; see note 33 supra & accompanying text.
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not possess the shrewd, discriminating intent attributed to him by
the court." Phelps, however, failed to address this problem.
The court in Phelps referred to a second class of cases, dealing
with impersonation by agents, that also turned on the owner's in-
tent. Typical of these was the earlier case of Hentz v. Miller, 3 which
involved a wrongdoer who falsely represented that he was the
broker-agent of two reputable business firms.44 His impersonation
induced the plaintiffs to deliver two hundred bales of cotton to him,
which he promptly sold to the defendant, a good faith purchaser for
value." The court in Hentz protected the original owner's interests,
reasoning that he intended to transfer title primarily to the princi-
pals whom the wrongdoer pretended to represent and only secondar-
ily to the wrongdoer as their agent, whether real or fictitious."
The multifaceted Phelps rule, which always relied on the owner's
supposed intent, created a narrow exception to the rule that no one
could transfer better title than he himself had: a wrongdoer who
impersonated a man of credit in a face-to-face transaction acquired
the power to transfer a good title to an innocent purchaser for
value." The court referred to this theoretical power, without defin-
42. Warren, supra note 9, has written, "[A]s these impersonation cases indicate, some-
times the courts have been trapped in the web of their own logic. There is no rational basis
for protecting a good faith purchaser from a face-to-face impersonator while refusing to
protect a good faith purchaser from one who misrepresents by letter." Id. at 477 (emphasis
supplied). See also Note, The Good Faith Purchase of Goods and "Entrusting" to a Merchant
under the Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-403, 38 IND. L.J. 675 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as The Good Faith Purchase of Goods], wherein the author states, "Unless the difference in
these two kinds of transactions is based on some mysterious distinction of dealing in person,
instead of by correspondence, the rationale and result in these two cases is inconsistent. "Id.
at 679 (emphasis supplied).
43. 94 N.Y. 64 (1883).
44. Id. at 65.
45. Id. at 66.
46. Id. at 71-72. The court in Hentz wrote, "It may be, as the appellant insists, that the
owner was influenced in the sale to some extent by the financial responsibility of the assumed
brokers, but the professed guaranty was only another element of fraud." Id. The reasoning of
the court in Phelps was similar: "There is no intention on the part of the vendor to sell to
the pretended agent or representative and no title passes." 220 N.Y. at 235, 115 N.E. at 442;
accord, Smith Premier Typewriter Co. v. Stidger, 18 Colo. App. 261, 71 P. 400 (1903); Alexan-
der v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81, 4 N.E. 433 (1886); Rogers v. Dutton, 182 Mass. 187, 65 N.E.
56 (1902); Windle v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 204 Mo. App. 606, 216 S.W. 1020 (1919); M.
Brotchiner & Sons, Inc. v. M. Ullman, Inc., 141 Misc. 102, 252 N.Y.S. 244 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Hamet v. Letcher, 37 Ohio St. 356 (1881); Dean v. Yates, 22 Ohio St. 388 (1872); Barker v.
Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427 (1872); Mayhew v. Mather, 82 Wis. 355, 52 N.W. 436 (1892). Contra,
Hawkins v. Davis, 67 Tenn. 506 (1875).
47. Professor Brown stated the rule of voidable title as follows:
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ing it, as "at least a voidable title."48 The result in Phelps was very
troublesome. The first and most conspicuous source of criticism was
the court's attempt to distinguish indistinguishable fact situations,
purportedly by giving effect to the owner's intent. 9 Although the
various distinctions were simple to apply, the reasons behind them
were obscure.50 The obvious conclusion, which the court ignored,
was that the owner in all cases intended to transfer title only to a
person who could be trusted to give him something of equal value
in return. In each case the owner, though deceived as to the identity
of the negotiator, intended to transfer title to his property to that
negotiator in the hope of making a profit from the transaction. Al-
though courts recognized this aspect only in the mail-fraud cases,
arguably in all of the voidable title cases the owner primarily in-
tended to deal with a solvent buyer. This one factor, common to all
the cases, should have been the primary focus of any rule founded
upon the owner's intent.'
If the owner of goods is induced by fraud, misrepresentation, or duress to part
with title to his property, the vendee nevertheless secures title to the goods in
question, though the vendor, on discovery of the fraud or duress, may annul the
sale and repossess himself of the goods in question.
R. BROWN, supra note 6, § 9.6, at 197. Although fraud accounted for most of the voidable title
cases, the concept of voidable title was applied in other situations as well. E.g., Harris v.
Harris, 64 Cal. 108, 28 P. 63 (1883) (title to horses sold by insane person voidable as against
a good faith purchaser); Campbell v. Brackenridge, 8 Blackf. 471 (Ind. 1847) (title to goods
sold by drunk voidable only until transfer to good faith purchaser); Hill v. Anderson, 4 Miss.
(5 S. & M.) 216 (1845) (title to slaves sold by infant voidable as against good faith purchaser);
Morris v. Hall, 89 W. Va. 460, 109 S.E. 493 (1921) (title to land sold by insane person voidable
as against good faith purchaser).
48. 220 N.Y. at 234, 115 N.E. at 442.
49. But cf. The Good Faith Purchase of Goods, supra note 42, in which the author argued
that the agency-impersonation cases were distinguishable:
Even though the defrauder takes no title in agency fraud as opposed to voidable
title in face to face fraud, the difference in result does not depend on an incon-
sistent analysis of the owner's intention. . . . In agency fraud courts would not
seem to have to look at the owner's intention as much as at the desirability of
protecting ownership interests.
Id. at 679-80 (footnote omitted).
50. One commentator has referred to the distinctions as "metaphysical." R. BROWN, supra
note 6, § 9.6, at 200.
51. Some recognition of this aspect of the voidable title cases is found in Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). Professor Gilmore
approved the voidable title principle as an attempted solution to this problem because it
"made it possible to throw the risk on the true owner in the typical commercial situation while
protecting him in the noncommercial one . . . .On the whole voidable title proved a useful
concept." Id. at 1060.
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The second, more subtle flaw in Phelps is that the court focused
on the owner's intent when it was irrelevant, at least from the view-
point of the innocent transferee .2 The owner's subjective intent
could hardly have supplied the innocent purchaser with realistic
criteria for judging the legitimacy of the transaction .5 3 Nevertheless,
as a device for furthering the interests of the original owner, the
approach might have been justifiable to the extent that it advanced
such a policy, but it suffered from two primary weaknesses. First,
the court left unclear why, in a controversy involving the competing
interests of two equally innocent parties, the original owner's inter-
ests were preferred over those of the subsequent transferee.54 The
court begged the question by favoring the original owner under the
guise of protecting property rights; by lending its support to one
litigant over another, it in effect determined whose interests consti-
tuted legal ownership of the property in dispute." In each of the
cases discussed, the court failed to consider the competing equities
involved. Only in Hentz did the court acknowledge that both the
defrauded original owner and the good faith purchaser were inno-
cent. Nevertheless, it added, "[T]here is no reason, therefore, why
the former should be a sufferer rather than the latter."5 If the court
had reasoned further, it would have concluded, 'nor is there any
reason why the latter should be a sufferer rather than the former.'
Unfortunately, by blindly applying the owner-intent test, the court
ended its analysis before it really began. The second weakness in the
justifications for protecting the original owner's interests was its
effect on future wrongdoers. To the extent that courts succeeded in
52. One commentator referred to the impersonation cases as "characterized by a shameless
manipulation by the courts of what is laughingly referred to as the intent of the parties."
Warren, supra note 9, at 475 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 471. Warren adds, "Thus the law scrutinized what the buyer was blind to." Id.
54. Compare Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924) (preference
for the owner over the good faith purchaser increased the negotiability of goods) with L. VOLD,
supra note 17, § 30, at 176-77 (the voidable title exception, in providing support for the good
faith purchaser, enhanced the negotiability of goods).
55. Commentators have recognized for generations that judges, in forcing apparently rigid
rules to conform to complex fact patterns, in reality, are choosing the party who will prevail.
See generally T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MOD-
ERN MIND (1930); G. GILMORE, THi DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); Cohen, The Basis of Contract,
46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 431 (1930).
56. 94 N.Y. at 71.
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protecting the original owner's property interests, they probably
discouraged him from spending his own resources to prevent fraud
or theft.5 7 In fact, the original owner could recover his property
under the owner-intent rule even if he were grossly negligent. 8 In
this respect the doctrine conflicted with, and in some instances
defeated, the policy of forcing the person who made the wrong possi-
ble to bear the loss. At least theoretically, then, the owner-intent
doctrine, instead of deterring, actually may have contributed to the
number and success of thefts and deceptions.
The third defect in Phelps was its failure to define voidable title.
While granting "at least a voidable title"59 to a defrauder, the court
neither set out what constituted such title nor examined its implica-
tions." This deficiency was not of purely academic interest because
the definition itself could provide guidelines for determining when
voidable title should be granted. It also could affect significantly the
status of both the wrongdoer and the innocent transferee in the
interval between the initial fraud and the subsequent sale. To illus-
trate, if a voidable title were defined as an inferior title, it would
be less valuable than a good title. An innocent transferee could
never determine whether he was purchasing a less valuable title;
therefore, presumably a merchant-transferee" would tend to pay
57. The function of commercial law, however, arguably is not the deterrence of criminals
but rather the resolution of disputes arising from commercial transactions. 17 U. BUFFALO L.
REV. 865, 885 (1968).
58. Under the rule, for example, an owner could leave his automobile parked at the side of
the curb, with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. If a wrongdoer passed by at
the right moment and appropriated the chattel for later sale to an unsuspecting purchaser,
the original owner conceivably could still recover.
59. 220 N.Y. at 234, 115 N.E. at 442.
60. Id. Unfortunately, the court in Phelps shared with numerous other courts and commen-
tators an inability to formulate a definition. Professor Gilmore described voidable title as "a
vague idea, never defined and perhaps incapable of definition, whose greatest virtue, as a
principle of growth, may well have been its shapeless imprecision of outline." Gilmore, supra
note 51, at 1059. The various definitions of voidable title attempted by commentators have
been decidedly unsatisfactory. Professor Weber, for example, wrote that "a person's title to
goods is said to be voidable when he holds a legal title but his transferor has the right to avoid
the transfer and reassert title in himself." Weber, The Extension of the Voidable Title Princi-
ple Under the Code, 49 Ky. L. REV. 437, 439 (1961) (footnote omitted). In 17 U. BUFFALO L.
REV. 865 (1968), the author explained, "The voidable title doctrine held [sic] that the
transaction was only voidable between the owner and the transferor, and once the goods
passed to a bona fide purchaser the owner's rights were lost." Id. at 869 (footnote omitted).
See generally 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 26, §§ 311, 348.
61. For the purposes of this Note, a merchant is a vendor who is able to distribute a loss
to consumers through business operations.
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less for any given purchase, and a nonmerchant transferee would
tend to refrain from making as many purchases. If all purchasers
reacted in this way, the effect on commerce could be substantial.
Furthermore, different definitions of voidable title could lead to
varying results in a situation involving an extended chain of title.
For example, if a wrongdoer transferred to an innocent purchaser
who subsequently transferred to a purchaser with notice of the ini-
tial wrongdoing, the second purchaser's rights or duties would de-
pend on the definition of voidable title used by the court. If voidable
title were defined as merely an inferior title, having less value than
good title, it would include no power to cut off the rights of the
original owner. Using this definition, the original owner would re-
cover from the second transferee; the voidable title would prevail
only if the prospective holder of the title took without notice of the
initial wrongdoing.
An alternate definition of voidable title, however, would create a
conditional power in the wrongdoer to transfer perfect title to a
subsequent good faith purchaser. The power of the original owner
to avoid the earlier sale before the wrongdoer sold the goods to a
good faith purchaser would operate as a condition subsequent. That
condition subsequent, similar to a power to rescind a contract,
would allow the owner to extinguish the wrongdoer's power to trans-
fer title if he acted before any transfer to an innocent buyer. Under
this definition of voidable title, the result in the example given
would change: the knowing second transferee would acquire a per-
fect title and prevail against the original owner because of the fail-
ure of the condition subsequent to occur. Transfer by the wrongdoer
to an innocent purchaser would terminate the ability of the original
owner to void the wrongdoer's power to transfer perfect title. The
innocent transferee thus would acquire perfect title, including the
power to transfer his title to others. A well-defined voidable title
exception would clarify the rights and duties of each and thereby
eliminate the possibility of courts reaching such differing results.
The impersonation cases illustrate the difficulties of designing a
rule for resolving controversies between an innocent purchaser and
an equally innocent owner. By framingdthe issues, they provide a
useful introduction to the intermediate area of common law voida-
ble title; a comparison of the cash-sale cases with the credit-sale
cases further clarifies the complexities of this area of the law.
[Vol. 20:513
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Voidable Title: The Cash-Sale Doctrine
The cash-sale transaction at common law contemplated the pas-
sage of title from the original owner to his vendee at the simultane-
ous occurrence of two mutually dependent events: the owner's
transferral of possession and the vendee's completion of payment. 2
62. The requirements for a cash sale varied with the transaction. If, for example, the sale
involved goods too bulky for delivery at the same moment as payment, payment and delivery
could be merely substantially simultaneous. Thus, if the execution of the two covenants was
substantially simultaneous, the transaction was considered a cash sale even if payment or
delivery was delayed. E.g., In re Perpall, 256 F. 758, 760 (2d Cir. 1919) (terms of contract
failing to provide expressly that payment be made on delivery, intent of the parties deter-
mined whether payment and delivery should be concurrent acts; intent was seen in the
custom and usage of the bond trade, which allowed for staggered payment and delivery, but
which dictated that title did not pass until both acts were completed). But cf. Smith v. Lynes,
5 N.Y. 41, 44 (1851) (failure of vendor to demand immediate payment on delivery or to attach
some other condition of payment to the exchange indicated a waiver of the condition of cash
sale; complete title thus passed to the vendee on delivery of the chattel).
If the accepted trade custom and usage did not include provision for delayed payment in a
cash sale, the vendor was confronted with two alternatives when the vendee failed to pay on
delivery. He could either demand return of the goods, thus reacquiring possession in addition
to his never-relinquished title, or extend credit to the delinquent vendee, thus waiving both
his right to substantially simultaneous payment and his right to title. See, e.g., Engstrom v.
Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951) (ten-day delay in depositing check for sale of wheat held
not a waiver of cash sale because such a delay was common to the wheat farmers of this
region); Kirk v. Madsen, 240 Iowa 532, 36 N.W.2d 757 (1949) (delay of a few days between
default of check and vendor's attempt to regain possession of automobile held not a waiver
of cash sale); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935)
(no waiver of cash sale despite more than a week's delay in payment; seller's explicit refusal
to grant buyer's request for credit entitled to great weight).
The extension of credit could occur immediately if the vendor failed to exercise his rights
promptly. See generally L. VOLD, supra note 17, § 30, at 164-69. This waiver of the right to a
cash sale had significant consequences for the owner. E.g., Meadows v. Hampton Live Stock
Comm'n Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 634, 131 P.2d 591 (1942) (seller who delivered cattle to buyer
and watched buyer sell cattle before payment was estopped from asserting his title against
the subsequent purchaser without notice).
Under most circumstances, however, in which no terms were expressed, the sales were
presumed for cash, not on credit, and no title passed until full payment was made. E.g.,
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. McCollum, 207 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1953) (sale of automobile
not completed until vendee's check honored; title did not pass because payment on vendee's
check was stopped, which entitled vendor to collect insurance on goods damaged); Ellis v.
Nelson, 68 Nev. 410, 233 P.2d 1072 (1951) (term cash sale construed as requiring payment in
full to be tendered before title or possession would be delivered, with no extension of credit);
Dazet v. Landry, 21 Nev. 291, 30 P. 1064 (1892) (payment required to be tendered at the
moment the bid was accepted in an auction sale "for cash", with no extension of credit
implied); Steward & Metler v. Scudder, 24 N.J.L. 96 (1853) (unless established custom and
usage were to the contrary, a cash sale was for money in hand); Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Beley
Cotton Co., 150 Tenn. 197, 200, 263 S.W. 87, 88 (1924) ("Where the sale is for cash on delivery,
a delivery is generally considered conditional, and no title vests in the buyer until he has
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Until both happened, the property interest remained in the owner,
and the vendee obtained only a void title. The contract terms or the
conduct of the parties determined whether a cash sale was in-
tended.13 If the vendee transferred the property to any subsequent
purchaser, that purchaser, or subvendee, acquired void title as well
because the vendee could pass no better title than he himself pos-
sessed. 4 In Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Association,"' for example,
a wrongdoer impersonated wealthy businessman Millard H.
McDonald and persuaded the plaintiff, a jeweler, to surrender pos-
session of a valuable diamond ring in exchange for the wrongdoer's
forged check. 6 The wrongdoer subsequently pledged the ring to the
defendant, a purchaser in good faith, and hastily departed. 7
In settling the resulting dispute, the court initially noted that
"[i]n the absence of evidence indicating that credit is to be given,
a sale is presumed to be for cash."6 The court reasoned that, be-
cause tender of the check did not constitute cash payment, the sale
was conditional, and title did not pass until the payor bank honored
complied with the terms of sale."); Duncan v. Stone, 45 Vt. 118 (1873) (delivery of property
under a contract of conditional sale made the vendee a bailee only); Bliss v. Arnold, Leggitt
& Lapham, 8 Vt. 252 (1836) (trade custom allowed delayed payment; until payment was
made, title remained in the seller); Tri-County Fin., Inc. v. Miller, 267 Wis. 174, 65 N.W.2d
39 (1954) (in the absence of a credit agreement between vendor and vendee, title to the
property remained in vendor until payment).
63. E.g., Winter v. Miller, 183 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1950) (intent of parties was guiding factor
in determining who held title; literal terms of contract could be supplemented by a practical
construction of the contract's provisions that conformed to the parties' conduct); Kirkpatrick
v. Chrysler Sales Corp., 127 Kan. 724, 275 P. 155 (1929) (conduct of the parties to a contract,
even if at variance with explicit contract provisions, may indicate the parties' intent and thus
determine whether the sale passed the property interest).
64. E.g., Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh, 101 U.S. 572 (1879) (the purchaser of nonnegotiable
demand instrument from person other than the original owner took only such rights as the
original owner transferred); Cutts v. Guild, 57 N.Y. 229 (1874) (assignee took his interest
subject to the equities between the original parties); Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C.
318, 75 S.E.2d 312 (1953) (transfer of automobile to vendee in exchange for check that was
later dishonored did not transfer title; therefore, sale by vendee to a good faith purchaser did
not vest good title because a possessor without title could not transfer title).
65. 186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932).
66. Id. at 237, 243 N.W. at 107.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 238, 243 N.W. at 107; accord, Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Wray, 177 Ark. 455, 6 S.W.2d
546 (1928); John N. Sims & Sons v. Bolton, 138 Ga. 73, 74 S.E. 770 (1912); Flannery v. Harley,
117 Ga. 483, 43 S.E. 765 (1903); Commercial Credit Co. v. Interstate Sec. Co., 197 S.W.2d
1000 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 43
P.2d 1078 (1935). See generally The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6.
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the check. 9 Furthermore, because the check was forged, title never
vested in either the wrongdoer or the subsequent purchaser. 0 The
court casually dismissed the argument that the wrongdoer, by im-
personating a man of credit, acquired a voidable title to the ring."
Without attempting to distinguish the impersonation cases the
court merely reiterated that, because the owner intended this to be
a cash sale and the wrongdoer had not completed payment, no title,
voidable or otherwise, ever passed.7 2 Gustafson thus limited signifi-
cantly the protection extended good faith purchasers by the imper-
sonation cases.
Gustafson typified several important aspects of the cash-sale doc-
trine. First, the opinion adhered rigidly to the common law pre-
sumption that, unless otherwise stated, the parties intended their
transaction to be for cash.13 Historically, the existence of a non-
credit, cash-and-carry economy justified this presumption of buyer
and seller expectations .7 Even after open credit became common-
place, however, and the presumption thus lost its credence, '75 it re-
tained vitality, developing into another device for arbitrary judicial
protection of the original owner's property interests.76
Gustafson was also representative of cash-sale cases in that it
dealt with a bad check. Although the cash-sale doctrine appeared
69. 186 Minn. at 238, 243 N.W. at 107; accord, Slaton v. Lamb, 260 Ala. 494, 71 So. 2d
289 (1954); Davidson v. Conner, 254 Ala. 38, 46 So. 2d 832 (1950); Publicker Commercial
Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A.2d 27 (1943).
70. 186 Minn. at 238, 243 N.W. at 107. The court stated, "The diamond in Madden's hands
was stolen property, and he had no title thereto. The transaction also constituted forgery at
common law. This was a felony. . . . Title to property obtained through common-law crime
does not pass to the vendee or pledgee." Id. (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. Professor Weber characterized the cash-sale doctrine as one limitation on the types
of transactions in which voidable title was seen as arising. Weber, supra note 60, at 442, 444.
One author claimed that many courts recently have abandoned this limitation. 17 U. BUFFALO
L. REv. 865, 870 (1968) and the cases cited therein.
73. See The Good Faith Purchase of Goods, supra note 42, at 685.
74. Id.
75. Id. See also The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 105 ("[Sleller recovery of
goods from bona fide third parties is no longer supported by sound commercial policy.").
76. For a vivid illustration of judicial determination to protect the original owner, see The
"Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6. The author compared the cases in which the courts
protected the owner from risk of loss due to the destruction of goods while in the hands of a
subsequent purchaser with the cases in which the courts protected the owner from risk of loss
due to a subsequent transfer of the goods by a wrongdoer to a good faith purchaser. In the
first group of cases the courts held that title passed; in the second group the courts held that
title did not transfer. Id. at 104-05 & n.24. See also note 6 supra & accompanying text.
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:513
in several different forms," the overwhelming majority of such cases
involved payment by a check that subsequently was dishonored. 8
The majority of courts confronted with bad-check cases held that
the exchange of a check for property did not constitute final pay-
ment, but was simply a means of obtaining payment. Hence, title
to the property did not pass to a subsequent good faith purchaser
unless and until the check given by the prior vendee was honored."
Some courts and commentators have indicated that this application
of the cash-sale doctrine increased the negotiability of goods by
reducing the risk to the seller of accepting payment by check. Argu-
ably, however, the convenience of checks contributed more signifi-
cantly to their prevalent use for sales in a modern economy than did
the rule granting the seller the right of repossession if he was victim-
ized by a bad check.'
The third aspect of the decision that was typical of cash-sale cases
was its adherence to a generally accepted common law rule: a
wrongdoer who obtained possession of goods through an act re-
garded as larcenous under the criminal law acquired no title to the
goods and could transfer none to a subsequent good faith purchaser
for value."' Although easily stated, the rule defied uniform applica-
77. Courts found cash sales in almost any transaction in which the buyer induced the seller
to deliver goods but failed to remit payment. E.g., Curme, Dunn & Co. v. Rauhs, 100 Ind.
247 (1884) (failure to remit cash); Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149 (1867) (payment by
note); Freeman v. Kraemer, 63 Minn. 242, 65 N.W. 455 (1895) (payment by draft).
78. Weber, supra note 60, at 444.
79. E.g., Slaton v. Lamb, 260 Ala. 494, 71 So. 2d 289 (1954); Barksdale v. Banks, 206 Ala.
569, 90 So. 913 (1921); Clark v. Hamilton Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, 284 P. 915 (1930);
Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A.2d 27 (1943); Handley
Motor Co. v. Wood, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d 391 (1953). Contra, Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co.,
118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948); Nelson v. Lewis, 143 Kan. 106, 53 P.2d 813 (1936);
Sullivan Co. v. Larson, 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 460 (1948).
80. The author of The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, stated, "[Tihe threat of
bad check losses should not necessarily outweigh the seller's interest in the speed and conven-
ience of check transactions." Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
81. 186 Minn. at 238, 243 N.W. at 107; see note 70 supra & accompanying text. But see
Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793), in which a wrongdoer obtained goods from
Patrick "by false pretences" and then pawned them to Parker. After Patrick regained the
goods, Parker sued to recover them. Although Patrick defended on the ground that the
wrongdoer acquired the goods through felonious fraud, the court held for Parker. The court
stated briefly, "This is distinguishable from the case of felony; for there by a positive statute
the owner, in case he prosecutes the offender to conviction, is entitled to restitution: but that
does not extend to this case, where the goods were obtained from the defendant by a fraud."
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Weber characterizes this decision as "the first reported case
in which the voidable title principle was applied." Weber, supra note 60, at 437 (footnote
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tion because of varying definitions of larcenous fraud in different
jurisdictions. Whereas some jurisdictions defined larcenous fraud in
common law terms,8  others used the definitions in their state's
criminal codes. 3 One court even found "trickery, artifice, and de-
ception" to be conduct sufficiently larcenous to preclude the trans-
fer of a voidable title. 4
Supporters of the larcenous-fraud rule rationalized that an owner,
when a victim of a crime, however defined, should not be required
to bear the resulting loss. 5 This argument suffered from several
flaws. First, the rule was applied imprecisely and inconsistently
among and even within jurisdictions" because the courts could not
decide definitively what conduct was so villainous as to trigger pro-
tection of the original owner. They condemned some types of fraud
as sufficiently scandalous to constitute larceny,87 yet forgave other
fraudulent activities as mere trickery.88 The varying treatment given
the several types of fraud by the courts produced results so incon-
sistent that even owners could not predict with certainty when their
interests would be protected.89 The second problem with the rule
omitted). For an interesting discussion of the decision and its relationship to both the voida-
ble title principle and the rule against transfer of title through the use of larcenous fraud,
see id. at 637-38, 465-66.
82. E.g., Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y.S. 518 (1925).
83. E.g., Beckwith v. Galice Mines Co., 50 Ore. 542, 93 P. 453 (1908).
84. Panhandle Pipe & Supply Co. v. S.W. Pressey & Son, 125 Colo. 355, 357, 243 P.2d 756,
759 (1952).
85. The Good Faith Purchase of Goods, supra note 42, at 688.
86. For a discussion of the unsteady development and vacillating application of the
larcenous-fraud concept in the law of sales in New York, see Weber, supra note 60, at 468
n.90.
87. E.g., Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932) (forgery);
Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y.S. 518 (1925) (forgery).
88. E.g., Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917). In Phelps the Court of
Appeals of New York distinguished the lower court's holding:
The learned Appellate Division rested their opinion upon the definition of
common-law larceny, holding that where such larceny had been committed the
thief acquired no title by his crime; where it had not, at least.a voidable title
passed. We agree with that statement of the law. But we should prefer to define
the rule in another form. Where the vendor of personal property intends to sell
his goods to the person with whom he deals, then title passes, even though he
be deceived as to that person's identity or responsibility. Otherwise it does not.
It is purely a question of the vendor's intention.
Id. at 234, 115 N.E. at 442.
89. Compare Gustafson, in which an impostor who induced the original owner to relinquish
possession of a diamond in exchange for a forged check was unable to transfer a good title,
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:513
was that in protecting the original owner, aggrieved initially by the
crime, courts ignored the rights of the good faith purchaser, also
victimized by the wrongdoer."0 Once again, when required to choose
between two equally innocent parties, courts failed to articulate a
well-reasoned rationale for favoring one over the other. The third
mistake in adding a larcenous-fraud limitation to the occasions
when voidable title would be granted lay in its irrelevance to a
property dispute in a commercial setting. Whereas the criminal law
existed to deter and punish offenders,9 this portion of the commer-
cial law served to resolve disputes that arose between innocent own-
ers and equally guiltless purchasers." No sound policy justified
using criminal law in the context of commercial law.
The fourth point Gustafson had in common with other cash-sale
cases was that its result was based on the theory that the original
owner did not intend to transfer title until the bank honored the
vendee's check. 3 No compelling reason was offered, however, to
justify this reliance on the purely subjective intent of the owner.94
In the typical bad-check case, the owner could have protected him-
self in one of several ways: by contacting the vendee's bank to deter-
mine whether the vendee had adequate funds on deposit to cover the
check; by retaining possession of the goods until the check was
with Phelps, in which an impostor who obtained jewelry on credit obtained a voidable title
and thereafter transferred a good title to a good faith purchaser.
90. See generally Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and
Conflicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGs L.J. 111 (1950).
91. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976).
92. 17 U. BUFFALO L. REv. 865, 885 (1968).
93. 186 Minn. at 238, 243 N.W. at 107.
94. One commentator criticized this result as allowing the intent of the vendor and vendee
in the prior transaction to determine the property interest of the subsequent good faith
purchaser, who was not a party to the earlier bargain. Levin, The Intention Fallacy in the
Construction of Title Retaining Contracts, 24 MICH. L. REV. 130, 137 (1925). A more appropri-
ate endeavor might be to judge the rights of the third party by looking to his role in the
tripartite transactional scheme, instead of concentrating on the intent of the two parties to
the original transaction. See also 29 YALE L.J. 346 (1920), in which the author wrote,
As between seller and buyer, intent may perhaps properly be made a crucial
operative fact (though even here such a test presents embarrassing difficulties,
as in the matter of mistake); but when the question is, whether a bona fide
subvendee for value is to be protected against the vendor, the problem becomes
wholly one of policy: under what states of fact are we going to protect such a
purchaser? The seller's intent, of one kind or another. . . may properly be one
of these operative facts; but surely it is not the only one, nor always the most
important . . ..
Id. at 347 n.14.
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honored; by requiring payment by certified check; or by demanding
cash if the vendee appeared to be untrustworthy." The subsequent
good faith purchaser, in contrast, had no similar means of reducing
liability by determining the validity of the prospective transferor's
title. No amount of diligence could have enabled the purchaser to
ascertain, with any reasonable certainty, either the method by
which his transferor obtained the goods from the original owner or
the intent of the original owner at the time of the prior transaction.
These realities of the marketplace demonstrated the absurdity of
allocating risk of loss on the basis of the subjective intent of the
individual who was better equipped to prevent and to bear the loss."
In contrast to the more typical cash-sale transaction, a credit sale
occurred if the owner waived his right to immediate payment, either
before or after he transferred possession of the goods." By delivering
possession and extending credit to the vendee in a credit sale, the
original owner enabled the vendee to transfer possession and owner-
ship to a subsequent good faith purchaser for value. The owner thus
transferred to the wrongdoer a form of voidable title, which operated
as a condition subsequent; it cut off the owner's right to title in the
property on transfer by the wrongdoer to a subpurchaser 8
The inequities of the cash-sale doctrine, combined with an inten-
sifying judicial desire to protect those who purchased in good faith
within the context of a modem economy, caused later courts to
struggle to find exceptions to the cash-sale rule.9 They used these
exceptions to bring commercial disputes within the credit-sale anal-
95. For an informative discussion of the varied protections available to the original owner,
see The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 105-06.
96. Id.
97. E.g., Lehman v. People's Furniture Co., 42 Okla. 761, 142 P. 986 (1914) (seller's failure
to exercise his right to reclaim goods in possession of buyer was excusable only if buyer had
deceived seller into not acting; lack of deception by buyer resulted in seller's delay being
regarded as an extension of credit).
98. E.g., Ryder v. Cooley, 58 Conn. 367, 20 A. 470 (1890) (if seller sold the trade, stock,
and goodwill of his business on credit, subsequent purchaser from vendee did not need to
assume the obligation of payment under the agreement between the two original parties); Bell
v. Cafferty, 21 Ind. 411 (1863) (if a person sold personal property in exchange for promissory
notes that the vendee knew were forged, the sale was not rendered absolutely void by the
fraud, but only voidable; the good faith purchaser, buying and obtaining possession before
the contract was rescinded, acquired a perfect title against the original seller).
99. See, e.g., Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E. 713 (1936)
(acceptance of worthless check by owner in return for invoice, even though marked "Paid by
two checks," estopped owner from protesting that no title passed to innocent buyer because
prior transaction was cash sale).
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ysis in order to protect good faith purchasers. State legislatures
aided the courts in this endeavor by enacting filing and recording
statutes to afford at least minimal protection to good faith purchas-
ers of valuable, mobile goods. Courts implemented these statutes by
treating the original transaction as a conditional sale, but imposing
a duty on the owner to record.10 If the owner failed to record, he was
estopped from invoking the protection of the cash-sale doctrine.'0 '
Additionally, some courts, reinterpreting the supposed intent of the
original owner, concluded that he meant to transfer, at least to a
merchant, the right to resell in exchange for a check.'0 2 This excep-
tion was particularly compelling and, hence, applied most often if
the vendee was a merchant who enjoyed a reputation in the com-
munity as a dealer in goods of the kind in dispute.'0 3 In addition, if
the original owner clothed the vendee with indicia of ownership by
delivering some evidence of title in the goods as well as possession,
the courts held that the owner was estopped from claiming that a
cash sale was contemplated.' 4 Some courts found that the owner
waived his right to cash payment-that is, extended credit-by not
100. Contra, Johnson-Brinkhan Co. v. Central Bank, 116 Mo. 558, 22 S.W. 813 (1893)
(recording statutes held not applicable unless the seller has extended credit).
101. E.g., Hall v. Le Croy, 79 Ga. App. 676, 54 S.E.2d 468 (1949) (rights of innocent third-
party purchasers were governed by the law of conditional sales; failure of vendor to reduce
sale to writing and record estopped vendor from protesting and prevented his recovery).
102. E.g., Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 Cal. App. 2d 197, 156 P.2d 261 (1945) (vendor also
estopped from protesting no title passed in exchange for worthless check because he stood by
and watched sheep sold by merchant).
103. When the owner sold goods, most often automobiles, to a dealer in goods of that kind,
the easiest way for him to restrict his vendee's ability to resell the goods was by eliminating
the vendee's ability to present himself to innocent purchasers as the titleholder. This condi-
tion was not met, however, if the owner gave the vendee certificate of title to the goods. E.g.,
Rapp v. Fred W. Hauger Motors Co., 77 Cal. App. 417, 246 P. 1067 (1926) (owner who
delivered automobile along with indorsed certificate of registration to dealer estopped from
asserting title against innocent purchaser); Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N.Y.S.2d 497
(1949) (owner who delivered automobile, indorsed statement of transfer, and certificate of
title to dealer engaged in selling cars estopped from claiming title against innocent purchaser
who justifiably relied). For further discussion of common law estoppel and entrustment
provisions, see notes 109-28 infra & accompanying text.
104. E.g., Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948) (dealer
intended to sell to vendee after face-to-face encounter; owner estopped because he placed
certificate of title as well as possession in vendee's custody in exchange for a check was was
later dishonored, thereby enabling vendee to present himself to innocent purchasers as hold-
ing title). But see Pearl v. Interstate Sec. Co., 217 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (owner
not estopped although he gave vendee bill of sale and certificate of title because subsequent
purchaser did not rely on titles, which were only seen after sale was made). See also note 109-
28 infra & accompanying text for further discussion of common law estoppel and entrustment.
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vigorously demanding immediate payment, while allowing the
vendee to retain possession for a prolonged time.'"5 Finally, the
courts sometimes simply determined that the owner intended to
engage in a credit transaction, thereby extending voidable title pro-
tection to a good faith purchaser.' 5
These diverse methods for protecting the good faith purchaser
created an unusual pattern of decisions. From these exceptions
emerged an unwritten rule that if the original transaction occurred
in a noncommercial setting, the owner would prevail; in contrast, if
the initial transaction transpired in a commercial context, the inno-
cent purchaser acquired title, and the owner bore the loss.'0 Al-
though commentators have offered policy reasons for this dichot-
omy,'0 8 courts never expressly admitted that the presence of a com-
mercial buyer influenced their decisions. This unstated commercial
factor simply added to the confusion of the owner-intent analysis,
the cash-sale doctrine, the impersonation cases, and the criminal
law larceny rule. Thus, on the eve of the drafting of the commercial
code, the common law doctrine of voidable title was fractured and
variable.
Estoppel
In addition to the voidable title concept, good faith purchasers
often' could claim the protection of the doctrine of estoppel. Estop-
pel was firmly rooted in the maxim, "Whenever one of two innocent
persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such
third person to occasion the loss must sustain it."'' ° The common
law imposed a duty on the purchaser to inquire into the title of his
vendor;"0 therefore, the mere voluntary delivery of possession to a
105. E.g., Lehman v. People's Furniture Co., 42 Okla. 761, 142 P. 986 (1914) (seller's
attempts to collect payment for six months and failure to rescind caused title to pass to
buyer). But see People's State Bank v. Brown, 80 Kan. 520, 103 P. 102 (1909) (failure of seller
to make early presentment of check did not prevent him from recovering from good faith
purchaser).
106. E.g., Smith v. Norman Motors Co., 84 Ga. App. 186, 65 S.E.2d 699 (1951) (seller's
treatment of the default by buyer on check as a debt held to constitute an extension of credit).
107. Gilmore, supra note 51, at 1061, and the cases cited therein.
108. See generally Coleman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks, and the Bona Fide Purchaser,
10 VAND. L. Rv. 55 (1956); Vold, supra note 90; The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note
6.
109. BROoM's LEGAL MAXIMs 463 (9th ed. 1911). See also O'Connor's Adm'rx v. Clark, 170
Pa. 318, 320, 32 A. 1029, 1030 (1895).
110. See notes 9-10 supra & accompanying text.
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wrongdoer alone did not estop the original owner from claiming title
as against a subsequent good faith purchaser."' Estoppel required
two additional elements. First, the original owner, either explicitly
or implicitly, must have given the wrongdoer indicia of ownership
sufficient to mislead the public into believing that the goods be-
longed to the wrongdoer. t 2 Second, the good faith purchaser must
have relied to his detriment on these misrepresentations of owner-
ship." 3
The early case of O'Connor's Administratrix v. Clark' illustrates
the application of this principle. The plaintiff's decedent directed
George Tracy to paint the words "George Tracy, Piano Mover" on
the side of a wagon owned by the plaintiff's decedent, in an attempt
to deceive the public into believing that Tracy owned the wagon.
The defendant, acting in good faith and relying on Tracy's apparent
authority to sell, purchased the wagon for a valuable consideration.
The court held that if a new jury found these facts to be true, then
the defendant should prevail.1' 5 It indicated that actions such as
these would warrant a finding by the jury that the owner "actually
intended to deceive" the public. 16
Although in principle estoppel provided some relief to good faith
purchasers, in practice those who sought its protection labored
under a very difficult burden of proof."7 Except in unusually fla-
grant cases, courts hesitated to find that an owner clothed a wrong-
111. E.g., Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N.E. 531 (1922) (delivery of
automobile and unindorsed certificate of title did not estop owner); Bustin v. Craven, 57
N.M. 724, 263 P.2d 392 (1952) (delivery alone not enough to estop vendor); Hardley Motor
Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 75 S.E.2d 312 (1953) (owner not estopped who delivered possession
of automobile only). But see Heath v. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499, 40 A. 547 (1898) (dicta that
delivery alone might be enough to estop vendor; vendor estopped because his vendee was
dealer in goods of that kind and an apparent agent of owner). See generally R. Brown, supra
note 6, § 9.7.
112. E.g., Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948) (turning
over certificate of title to wrongdoer); Silver v. Robert's Garage, Inc., 240 Mass. 571, 134 N.E.
610 (1922) (watching while wrongdoer sold property).
113. E.g., J.L. McLure Motor Co. v. McClain, 34 Ala. App. 614, 42 So. 2d 266 (1949) (buyer
relied on bill of sale and tag receipt); Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 Cal. App. 2d 197, 156
P.2d 261 (1945) (purchaser sorted lambs he bought from wrongdoer while original owner stood
by); Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W.2d 978 (1949) (purchaser shown bill of sale).
114. 170 Pa. 318, 32 A. 1029 (1895).
115. Id. at 320, 32 A. at 1030.
116. Id.
117. See 17 U. BUFFALo L. Rav. 865, 872 (1968), in which the author listed as elements that
usually aided the purchaser "whether the transferor is a dealer in those goods, prior dealings
between the transferor and purchaser, and trade practices."
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doer with indicia of title.' 8 Once again, the result usually depended
on the subjective intent of the original owner, as gleaned by the
court from his outward behavior. Therefore, although the owner's
gross negligence or laches usually sufficed to raise an estoppel, his"
simple negligence was not sufficient."' Moreover, the purchaser
could not always rely on even the strongest indicia of ownership to
estop the owner if the owner relinquished possession involuntarily.
In such instances, for example, as a sheriff's sale, the good faith
purchaser lost, even though the purchaser's reliance was completely
reasonable.' 0 Hence, because the outcome turned on factors outside
the knowledge of the purchaser under both the estoppel and voida-
ble title principles, the good faith purchaser seemed able to prevail
only through luck or clairvoyance.
Entrusting
If the good faith purchaser lost under both the voidable title and
estoppel principles, he was doomed to fail under the common law
of entrusting as well. Essentially, the entrusting doctrine provided
that an owner who delivered goods to a merchant in goods of that
kind, without placing any effective restrictions on the merchant's
ability to resell, would not be permitted to complain if the merchant
transferred the goods and title to a subsequent good faith pur-
chaser. 2' When an entrustment was found, courts presumed that
the owner intended "to transfer at least one element of title, the
right to resell."' 22 Lord Ellenborough first enunciated the rationale
underlying this principle in 1812 in well-known dicta:
118. See generally The Good Faith Purchase of Goods, supra note 42, at 688-90.
119. See 17 U. BUFFALO L. Rav. 865, 872 (1968) and the cases cited therein.
120. E.g., Griffith v. Fowler, 18 Vt. 390 (1846). But cf. Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adm. & Eccl.
469, -, 112 Eng. Rep. 179, 181 (K.B. 1837) (seller, "in standing by and giving a kind of
sanction to the execution," caused buyer at sheriff's sale to rely on his conduct and thus was
estopped to complain).
121. Lord Ellenborough first stated the concept of entrusting as follows:
If the principal send his commodity to a place, where it is the ordinary business
of the person to whom it is confided to sell, it must be intended that the com-
modity was sent thither for the purpose of sale. If the owner of a horse send it
to a repository of sale, can it be implied that he sent it thither for any other
purpose than that of sale? Or if one send goods to an auction-room, can it be
supposed that he sent them thither merely for safe custody? Where the commod-
ity is sent in such a way~and to such a place as to exhibit an apparent purpose
of sale, the principal will be bound, and the purchaser safe.
Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 43, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 760-61 (K.B. 1812) (emphasis supplied).
122. The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 103 (footnote omitted).
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Strangers can only look to the acts of the parties, and to the
external indicia of property, and not to the private
communicqtions which may pass between a principal and his
broker: and if a person authorize another to assume the apparent
right of disposing of property in the ordinary course of trade, it
must be presumed that the apparent authority is the real author-
ity . ... It is clear that [a broker] may bind his principal
within the limits of the authority with which he has been appar-
ently clothed by the principal in respect of the subject-matter;
and there would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he
could not. ,21
The entrustment principle, then, derived not only from the author-
ity aspect of estoppel, but also from the court's new-found recogni-
tion of both the innocent purchaser's position in the tripartite trans-
action and the significance of transfer of title to the general commer-
cial scheme.
In England the entrusting concept was embodied to some degree
in the law of the market overt, 2 1 which protected those who pur-
chased in the ordinary course of business from recognized dealers. 125
Courts in the United States, on the other hand, rejected the market
overt or entrusting principle outright,' although they used it bene-
ficially to some extent to define indicia of title in estoppel cases.'27
123. 15 East at 43, 104 Eng. RelP at 760 (emphasis supplied).
124. The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 Vict., c. 71, § 22 (1893) provided that "[wihere goods
are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title
to the goods, provided he buys them in good, faith and without notice of any defect or want
of title on the part of the seller." Blackstone explained the law as follows:
But property may also in some cases be transferred by sale, though the vendor
has none at all in the goods, for it is expedient, that the buyer, by taking proper
precautions, may be secure of his purchase, otherwise commerce would soon
end. Hence the rule of law is, that all sales and contracts of things vendible in
fairs or markets overt, that is, open, shall not only be good between the parties,
but also binding on all those, who have any right to property therein.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAmEs 372 (Browne's ed. 1897).
125. Blackstone offered the following definition and explanation of market overt:
Market overt in this country is only held on special days, provided by charter
or prescription for particular towns, but in London, everyday, except Sunday,
is market-day, and every store in which goods are publicly exposed for sale, is
market overt, for such things only as the owner professes to trade in.
Id.
126. E.g., Ventress v. Smith, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 161, 176 (1836); Griffith v. Fowler, 18 Vt.
390, 393 (1846).
127. See, e.g., Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948). See
also notes 103 & 104 supra & accompanying text.
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For the most part, however, American courts adhered to the maxim
that mere possession by a dealer in such goods provided no assur-
ance of title on which a good faith purchaser justifiably might rely.'
Nonetheless, to the extent that the courts applied the entrusting
principle, however begrudgingly, it lent some logic to an otherwise
irrational area of the law.' 29
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Uniform Sales Act
The first statute to preempt part of this intermediate area of the
common law was the 1906 Uniform Sales Act. 3 ' It codified a sub-
stantial portion of the common law of voidable title, providing in
section 24 that a seller with a voidable title could transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser. 3' Significantly, however, the Act
failed to define voidable title, leaving the common law as controlling
and sanctioning the illogical distinctions embodied in the imperson-
ation cases.'32
At least arguably, section 19 of the Act changed the common law
cash-sale presumption; absent an agreement, the Act presumed
that the parties intended title to pass at the time they contracted
for sale, whether for cash or credit.'33 Unfortunately, however, sec-
128. Cf. Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953) (lapse of
time, usage of trade, and past similar transactions between parties in addition to entrustment
to dealer held sufficient to estop owner from claiming title as against good faith purchaser
for value).
129. The entrusting concept was later incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code.
U.C.C. § 2-403(2)-(3). Professor Brown contends that this section essentially codifies Lord
Ellenborough's famous dicta quoted supra in notes 121 & 123 & accompanying text. R.
BROWN, supra note 6, § 9.7, at 204.
130. The Act was approved in 1906 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
131. Section 24 of the Act provided:
Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods,
provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's
defect of title.
UNIFORM SALES Acr § 24.
132. Section 73 of the Act stated:
In any case not provided for in this act, the rules of law and equity, including
the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to. . . the effect of fraud,
misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other invalidat-
ing cause, shall continue to apply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods.
Id.
133. Section 19, Rule 1, of the Act specified:
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tion 42, concerning the duties of the contracting parties, provided,
"Unless otherwise agreed, the delivery of the goods and the payment
of the price are concurrent conditions." '34 By misapplying section 42
and ignoring section 19, some courts reinstated the common law
cash-sale presumption.1 35 In addition, section 23 of the Act codified
the common law of transfer of title: the purchaser's failure to gain
any title from a thief, estoppel of a transferor by his own conduct,
and the loss of title by an owner in an entrusting situation.1 36 Thus,
except for a moderately successful attempt to modify that part of
the common law relating to cash sales, the Uniform Sales Act left
the intermediate area of the common law unchanged.
Legislative History of U. C. C. § 2-403
The Uniform Commercial Code then intervened into the transfer-
of-title morass created by the common law and continued by the
Uniform Sales Act. Although the drafters failed to specify their
goals for section 2-403, they expressed the overall purpose of the
Code in section 1-102. Section 1-102 indicates, in part, an intent
"(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commer-
cial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;
Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a
deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the con-
tract is made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the time of
delivery, or both, be postponed.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
134. Id. § 42. Section 42 provided further:
[T]hat is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the
goods to the buyer in exchange for the price and the buyer must be ready and
willing to pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods.
Id.
135. See The "Cash Sale" Presumption, supra note 6, at 101-03. The author added that
"such an interpretation of the Act is absurd." Id. and the cases cited therein. See also L.
VoLD, supra note 17, § 30, at 162 (interpretating § 19 to have changed the common law cash-
sale presumption).
136. Section 23 provided in part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who
is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with
the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than
the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller's authority to sell.
UNioRm SAmes Acr § 23 (emphasis supplied). The Act did not specify under what circum-
stances the owner was precluded; thus, it must be assumed that both the common law of
estoppel and of entrusting retained validity. See notes 26 & 132 supra.
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[and] (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions."' 37 This provision comprises a part of the actual law; there-
fore, its dictates are of primary significance, and section 2-403 must
be interpreted pursuant to the express goals stated in section 1-102.
Section 1-102, however, states only a broad statutory purpose that
fails to resolve the ambiguities of section 2-403. Thus, secondary
materials and other parts of the Code must supply the basis for any
interpretation of the legislators' intent. Useful sources include early
drafts of the section, the New York Law Revision Commission's
suggested revisions, the Code comments, and analogous Code provi-
sions.
The 1952 version was the first draft of the Code enacted by a state
legislature.'38 It contained a section 2-403(1) dealing with voidable
title, which restated substantially the Uniform Sales Act's section
23.11 The provision read, "A person with voidable title has power
to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."1 40 Like
the Uniform Sales Act, it failed to define voidable title and thus
codified the common law. In addition, although section 2-401(1)(b)
provided that "no agreement that a contract for sale is a 'cash sale'
alters the effect of identification or impairs the rights of good faith
purchasers from the buyer,"' 41 section 2-403 failed to address the
cash-sale issue at all. Both of these omissions from section 2-403
evidently troubled the New York Law Revision Commission, whose
members recommended in 1956 that the Code be shelved until fur-
ther revision."' The Commission proposed a supplemental section,
which provided:
When a transferor has a right to recover goods from a trans-
feree, the transferee's title shall be deemed to be voidable rather
137.'U.C.C. § 1-102. Comment 1 to this section provides further:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and
policies. The text of each section should be read in light of the purpose and
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the
application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case
may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon 1954).
139. See note 136 supra & accompanying text.
140. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1952).
141. Id.
142. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REviSION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CODE, Appendix IV (Excerpts from the Proceedings of the Commission), at 355-485
(1956).
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than void if the transferor delivered the goods to the transferee
pursuant to a transaction intended by the transferor to transfer
ownership in the goods. This rule includes but is not limited to
cases where
(a) the transferor is deceived as to the identity of the trans-
feree, or
(b) the transferor delivers the goods in exchange for a check
which is not collected because of insufficient funds;
(c) the delivery of the goods is procured through fraud pun-
ishable as larcenous under the criminal law.'
According to the Commission, the recommended provision was in-
tended "to deal with the question whether the buyer has 'voidable
title,' . . . in certain cases, including the case where seller has a
right to recover goods paid for by a check which is not paid."144
This commendable suggestion represents the only recorded at-
tempt to define statutorily the voidable title concept. Unfortun-
ately, it suffered from at least one fatal imperfection. Contrary to
the expressed intent of Karl N. Llewellyn, the chief reporter for the
Code, and others involved in the drafting process, the recommenda-
tion once again attempted to make the transfer of title dependent
on the presumed intent of the original owner."4 Although they re-
jected the proposed revision, the Code drafters did incorporate sev-
eral of its most significant features into the current section 2-403.
In addition, the Commission's extended deliberations precipitated
a significant policy statement by Llewellyn on the result intended
by the codification of voidable title. Referring to the fear that rights
of purchasers would be preferred under the Code over those of prior
owners, Llewellyn acknowledged that preference in his testimony:
"The choice is hard, and it gives little satisfaction, either way; but
the Code's choice fits more comfortably into the whole body of our
commercial law.' ' 4 Llewellyn's statement and the proposed revi-
sion itself represent the only legislative history available from the
Commission's hearings on section 2-403.
143. Id. at 383.
144. Id.
145. Many commentators judge harshly this practice of basing important property rights
and duties on a concept of title that is in turn rooted in the presumed and often nonexistent
intent of the original owner. E.g., Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,
15 N.Y.U.L. REv. 159 (1938).
146. REPORT OF THE NEW YoRK LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 123 (1954).
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The comments promulgated by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, which follow each provision in
the current version of the Code, provide a second source of legisla-
tive intent. These comments "set forth the purpose of various provi-
sions of this Act to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act
as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruc-
tion."1 7 It is unclear, however, whether the comments serve as au-
thority for interpreting legislative intent. To begin with, most juris-
dictions chose not to enact the comments as part of their statutory
law. In addition, at least one commentator characterized the com-
ments as inaccurate and outdated.' Certainly, if the language of a
particular Code section conflicts with its accompanying comment,
the comment must yield, and the text controls." 9 The official com-
ments to section 2-403 offer only vague notions of policy and purpose
and thus provide few useful guidelines for judicial application of
section 2-403.
The final secondary source of legislative intent is analogies to
Code provisions that treat similar problems successfully. Analogous
provisions are important because they reflect trends in legislative
thinking that often affect judicial attitudes toward similar prob-
lems. Fortunately, a counterpart provision to section 2-403 is avail-
able in section 3-405, which deals with the transfer of commercial
paper. 1" 0 To the extent that the sale of goods resembles the transfer
147. U.C.C. at XV.
148. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 798, 809 (1958) (quoting ALI & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (1957)).
149. Section 1-102 of the 1952 version stated that "[t]he Comments. . . may be consulted
. . . but if text and comment conflict, text controls." U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(f) (1952 version). This
language was deleted before the 1957 version was published because "the old cominents were
clearly out of date." Id. Comment.
150. Section 3-405 provides:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective
if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name
of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall alter the criminal or civil liability of the
person so indorsing.
U.C.C. § 3-405.
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of commercial paper, comment 2 to section 3-405 furnishes a provoc-
ative blueprint for eliminating the illogical distinctions that com-
prise the concept of voidable title. The comment provides:
Subsection (1) (a) is new. It rejects decisions which distinguish
between face-to-face imposture and imposture by mail and hold
that where the parties deal by mail the dominant intent of the
drawer is to deal with the name rather than with the person so
that the resulting instrument may be negotiated only by indorse-
ment of the payee whose name has been taken in vain. The result
of the distinction has been under some prior law, to throw the loss
in the mail imposture forward to a subsequent holder or to the
drawee. Since the maker or drawer believes the two to be one and
the same, the two intentions cannot be separated, and the
"dominant intent" is a fiction. The position here taken is that the
loss, regardless of the type of fraud which the particular impostor
has committed, should fall upon the maker or drawer. 5'
The usefulness of this analogy in reflecting legislative intent in
enacting 2-403 depends on the similarity of transactions in goods
and commercial paper. If the two situations are almost parallel, the
elimination of distinctions in one strongly suggests a similar result
in the other.52 All these interpretive aids, however, only provide
insight into how to apply section 2-403 to the extent that they are
reflected in the syntax of the section. Therefore, each source of
legislative intent must be evaluated in light of the express language
of the Code, which serves as the foundation for the rights and duties
now extant in the intermediate area.
THE CURRENT CODE DEFINITION OF VOIDABLE TITLE (CASE I)
The first part of section 2-403(1) provides that "[a] purchaser of
goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights
only to the extent of the interest purchased."'53 This sentence, in
both the 1952 and the current versions of the Code, restates the
common law maxim that even a good faith purchaser from one who
obtains goods by theft acquires no rights in the goods superior to
151. Id. Comment 2.
152. Contra, Miller v. Race, 1 Burr 452, 96 Eng. Rep. 1151 (K.B. 1758), in which Lord
Mansfield argued, "[B]ut the fallacy lies in comparing the note to things substantially
different: it is [not] goods."
153. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
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those of the original owner. '5" In addition, the provision allows a
purchaser to acquire all the interest that his transferor "had power
to transfer." This phrase indicates that, as against anyone other
than the original owner, the good faith purchaser from a thief re-
tains only a limited possessory interest, which is all his transferor
had. More importantly, the language suggests the existence of ex-
ceptions to the general rule. For example, if the court decides that
the original owner is estopped from asserting his rights as against a
good faith purchaser, it also in effect determines that the wrongdoer
at least at one point had the power to transfer a good title to that
good faith purchaser.
Although the first sentence does not mention the estoppel princi-
ple explicitly, such an interpretation is reasonable in light of several
sources of legislative intent. First, as early as 1955, the New York
Law Revision Commission reached a similar conclusion as to the
syntax of the 1952 provision.'55 Second, the comments to section 2-
403 state its purpose as "[t]o gather together a series of prior uni-
form statutory provisions and the case-law thereunder and to state
a unified and simplified policy on good faith purchase of goods."' 56
Among these uniform statutes was section 23 of the Uniform Sales
Act, which dealt with estoppel. Third, the first clause of section 2-
403, like its remaining portions, should be interpreted according to
the expressed purpose of the drafters. As stated earlier, that purpose
is reflected in Karl Llewellyn's admission that the Code defended
purchasers against prior owners.157 The New York Law Revision
Commission also observed that "[t]he principal thrust of the sec-
tion is towards strengthening the rights of purchasers as against
prior owners."'58
The second part of section 2-403(1) provides:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to
a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power
even though
154. See R. BROWN, supra note 6.
155. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 455 (1955).
156. U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment.
157. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
158. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 454 (1955).
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(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the pur-
chaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dis-
honored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale",
or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as lar-
cenous under the criminal law.'59
Although they rejected the New York Law Revision Commission's
proposed revision,6 0 which defined voidable title, the drafters con-
spicuously failed to adopt any other definition. Instead, the second
part of section 2-403(1) simply mirrors the common law consequence
that one who obtains a voidable title acquires a vague, undefined
power to transfer a better title than he has, without specifying under
what circumstances a purchaser acquires a voidable title. Courts
and commentators, however, should resist fiercely any effort to fill
this void with the common law principles of voidable title. Section
2-403, in attempting drastic changes in the statement of the com-
mon law in the intermediate area, impliedly rejects any resort to the
common law definitions of voidable title. Sentence three of section
2-403(1) sets out four circumstances under which a purchaser who
does not acquire voidable title can still transfer better title than he
has. The grammatical structure of this sentence denotes four excep-
tions to the general rule in addition to the voidable title exceptions.
Consequently, the third sentence in effect defines what circumstan-
ces do not convey voidable title, but which do confer upon a wrong-
doer a power akin to voidable title. Section 2-403, then, yields the
same result for these four subdivisions as for the voidable-title case:
the power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
The first of the four subsections grants such power to a purchaser
even though the transferor is deceived as to his identity. Most com-
mentators have concluded from all the sources of legislative intent
that the drafters promulgated this clause solely to eliminate the
meaningless distinctions in the impersonation area of common law
voidable title.'"' Many of the situations governed by the four subsec-
tions, however, would not be affected if the Code definition of
159. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
160. Weber, supra note 60, at 450.
161. E.g., The Good Faith Purchase of Goods, supra note 42, at 682-83.
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"purchase" as any transfer creating an interest in property'2 is read
strictly. For example, a sale to one who impersonates by mail cre-
ates no interest in property and, hence, no purchase occurs. Read
in this manner, this subsection arguably does not change the result
that obtained under the common law. If, on the other hand, giving
a broad reading to "purchase", a mere possessory interest satisfied
the Code definition, then this subsection would eliminate the com-
mon law distinctions between face-to-face fraudulent impersonation
and that carried out by mail. Even read this broadly, however, the
Code still would maintain the distinction between these two types
of impersonation and the pretended-agent cases because this
subsection only confers the power to transfer a good title if the
transferor is deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, not the
purchaser's principal.
The dilemma over how to read the Code definition of "purchase"
is inescapable. If a strict reading is given to the word, the changes
wrought by section 2-403(1) are eliminated, and the common law
survives. The overall Code purpose clearly was to'reform the com-
mon law in this area. On the other hand, a broad reading of pur-
chase to include the delivery of a mere possessory interest would
substantially revise the common law of voidable title, as intended,
but would leave section 2-403(2), the entrusting provision, contrib-
uting nothing to the section; one should not presume that legislators
intend to create superfluous provisions.
The best explanation seems to be that in adding the four excep-
tions to section 2-403(1), the drafters forgot to revise the definition
of "purchase", thus in effect negating their own additions. Several
other factors indicate that the draftsmen desired to expand rather
than to merely maintain the protection offered good faith purchas-
ers. First, this interpretation is consistent with the Code's, general
policy of promoting uniformity in the laws of the various states.
Second, in rejecting the New York Law Revision Commission's rec-
ommended addition, the drafters evinced a distaste for the use of
the owner's intent as the guiding factor in transfer-of-title cases. To
reinstate the impersonation distinctions would directly contradict
this preference. Third, as stated earlier, the fact that the drafters
did not revise the definition of "purchase" when they amended
162. Section 1-201 defines a purchase as follows: 'Purchase' includes taking by sale,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (emphasis supplied).
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section 2-403(1)'1" indicates that the inconsistency resulted from
oversight rather than design. Fourth, by retaining substantially in-
tact the three subdivisions in the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion's suggested change, the Code drafters showed their desire to
adopt the Commission's rationale and abolish the impersonation
distinctions. Fifth, the adoption of section 3-405 on the transfer of
commercial paper demonstrated a trend toward greater transfera-
bility of title and indicated the contempt felt by the drafters toward
distinctions of this sort. Finally, comment 1 to section 2-403 makes
explicit the Code's policy of offering even further protection to the
good faith purchaser: "The basic policy of our law allowing transfer
of such title as the transferor has is generally continued and ex-
panded under subsection (1)."'11
In addition to the first subsection's protection of the innocent
purchaser in impersonation cases, the other subsections further pro-
tect the purchaser when he is unable to ascertain whether his trans-
feror took possession under a cash-sale agreement, in exchange for
a bad check, or in contravention of the law of criminal fraud. These
provisions also suffer if a strict reading is given to the Code defini-
tion of "purchase", but such a reading should be rejected, as stated
earlier, because it would defeat legislative intent and render all four
subsections superfluous.
Assuming that section 2-403 does protect the good faith purchaser
who acquires possession under these subsections, the main question
remains under what circumstances a transferee acquires a voidable
title under the Code. The subsections designate those situations
that no longer constitute voidable title; previously these same trans-
actions defined the common law area of voidable title. Thus, para-
doxically, the exceptions swallowed the rule, and section 2-403
voided the previous situations of voidable title without explaining
what, if anything, gives rise to voidable title under the Code.
Application of Section 2-403(1) (Case I) by the Courts
According to one commentator, section 2-403(1) provides its own
methodology for resolving disputes that arise in what was formerly
a voidable title context.1 5 The court initially determines whether a
163. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201 (1978) with id. § 1-201 (1952).
164. U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 1 (emphasis supplied).
165. 17 U. BUFFALO L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1968).
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transferee qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value.'6 Next, it
decides whether the transferor possesses the power to transfer a good
title. This methodology further requires a judicial statement of
meaningful standards for ascertaining the types of factual situations
in which voidable title is granted; unfortunately, not all courts pro-
mulgate such guidelines.'67 A study of 114 cases dealing with section
2-403 decided since 19608 is convincing evidence that litigants,
students, advocates, and perhaps even judges would benefit enor-
mously if such a methodology were mandated by statute. Only three
of fifty-four reported cases applying section 2-403(1)'s voidable title
concept since 196069 attempted to define, even superficially, the
principle employed in the decisions.' 0 In the overwhelming majority
of cases, the judges merely recited the facts, quoted from the Code,
and then announced the winner. This lack of analysis ii the many
decisions applying section 2-403 makes any detailed discussion of
the cases impossible. This Note, therefore, merely catalogues the
results and discusses a few of the more provocative decisions.
Not surprisingly, courts have held uniformly that, pursuant to
section 2-403(1), a thief still can transfer nothing more than a void
title."' Due to the Code's elimination of common law voidable title,
166. Section 1-201 provides the following definitions: "(19) 'Good Faith' means honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned; . . . . (33) 'Purchaser' means a person who
takes by purchase; . . . . (44) 'Value' . . . [A] person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires
them . . .(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract."
167. 17 U. BUFFALO L. REV. 865, 875 (1968).
168. The study included all cases purporting to apply § 2-403 that were listed in the U.C.C.
Reporter Service.
169. Only 54 out of 114 cases dealt with the § 2-403(1) voidable title principle. The rest
concerned the entrusting provision in § 2-403(2).
170. E.g., Schrier v. Home Indemnity Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 688, 691 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1971) ("In the context of the commercial code, however, the principle of voidable
title refers to persons who have been entrusted with the possession of the goods they sell by
consignors, creditors with unrecorded security interests, and certain other kinds of bailors.");
Stratton v. Sale Barn, Inc., 28 Agric. Dec. 677 (1969) ("Complainant as a defrauded seller
retained an equitable right of rescission which it could exercise against anyone but a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice."); Lane v. Honeycutt, 14 N.C. App. 436, -, 188
S.E.2d 604, 605 (1972) ("2-403 . . .now allows the vendee in such a transaction to transfer a
good title to a 'good faith purchaser for value'," but the court found that the defendant-buyer
did not fit that definition).
171. E.g., Schrier v. Home Indemnity Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (a
possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, can never transfer good title);
Lieber v. Mohawk Arms, Inc., 206 Misc. 2d 206, 208, 314 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (App. Div. 1970)
("The defendant, despite its good faith, has no title since its possession is derived from a
thief."); P.R. Autos, Inc. v. Truelson Motors, Inc., - N.Y.S.2d - , 6 U.C.C. Rep. 672,
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courts are not bound and therefore could extend protection to good
faith purchasers, even to those buying from thieves. Instead, they
have reverted to the old policy of protecting the original owner. In
McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson,' for example, W.A. Andres
leased a mobile home for a thirteen-day rental period to an individ-
ual who later attained the status of a wrongdoer. At the end of the
lease period, the wrongdoer sold the home to McDonald, a dealer
in mobile homes, who purchased in good faith and who subse-
quently transferred possession to Johnson, a nonmerchant good
faith purchaser for value. After the original owner regained posses-
sion of his property, this dispute ensued.1 3 Without defining voida-
ble title and without considering the possible relevance of the sec-
tion 2-403(2) entrusting provision, the court merely quoted from the
Code and awarded the value of the home to Johnson because
McDonald has breached his warranty of good title. McDonald did
not get good or even voidable title from the wrongdoer and thus
could transfer none to Johnson. The court reasoned that the wrong-
doer obtained an undefined voidable title when he first leased the
mobile home, but his voidable title expired with the thirteen-day
rental period, after which he could not transfer any title.7,
Lack of analysis was only one of several major flaws in this deci-
sion. Without defining voidable title, the court determined quite
readily that voidable title becomes void immediately on the expira-
tion of a thirteen-day rental period. Failing to consider either the
intent of the legislators or the equities of the parties before it, the
court read the first sentence of section 2-403(1) without examining
its relation to the whole scheme of the Code.
Thus, even under the Code, common law estoppel provisions have
continued to serve as a judicial safety valve for protecting good faith
purchasers who fail to meet the requirements of any of the statuto-
rily created voidable title exceptions.' 75 Significantly, however,
courts have failed to design any new voidable title situations to
673 (Sup. Ct. 1969) ("The owner of the car did nothing to give voidable title to the thief or
any later purchaser.").
172. - Ind. App. -, 376 N.E.2d 106 (1978).
173. Id. at 376 N.E.2d at 107-08.
174. Id. at -, 376 N.E.2d at 109-10.
175. See, e.g., Tumber v. Automation Design & Mfg. Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 324 A.2d
602 (1974) (good faith buyer won, but entrusting provisions gave way to common law of
estoppel because seller did not qualify as a merchant who dealt in goods of the kind in
question).
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replace the common law cases absorbed by the third sentence in
section 2-403; nor have they confronted the impersonation issue,
thus leaving a major ambiguity in the Code unresolved.
THE CURRENT CODE ENTRUSTING PROVISION (CASE II)
Section 2-403(2) sets out the entrusting provisions of the Code:
"Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business. 176 This part of
the Code adopts substantially Lord Ellenborough's statement of the
entrusting concept, quoted previously.' 77 The all-inclusive "[a]ny"
of this provision indicates that in a case involving both an entrust-
ing and a commercial transaction,178 this provision supersedes not
only the common law voidable title exception, but also all other
parts of section 2-403. Nonetheless, the buyer's right to protection
of the potentially good title he gains in a commercial transaction is
limited in at least three ways by section 2-403's entrusting provi-
sions.
First, the entrusting of possession must meet the definition in
section 2-403(3):
"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in re-
tention of possession regardless of any condition expressed be-
tween the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless
of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's
disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under
the criminal law.' 79
Thus, any voluntary transfer of possession by the original owner,
regardless of his intent, is an entrusting; it includes, but is not
limited to, any "purchase" as defined by section 1-201(33).1'1 There-
fore, no transfer of title, voidable or otherwise, is required. For ex-
ample, although a bailment does not qualify as a purchase under
the Code, it does constitute an entrusting within the reach of section
2-403(3). Once a voluntary transfer of possession occurs, the original
176. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
177. See notes 121 & 123 supra & accompanying text.
178. For the purposes of this paper, a commercial transaction is one in which the seller is
a merchant dealing in goods of the kind that the buyer seeks to acquire.
179. U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
180. See note 162 supra.
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owner must acquiesce in the merchant's continuing retention of
possession. Unfortunately, the Code's failure to define acquiescence
creates an ambiguity. For example, it is not clear whether a mere
letter of disapproval to the merchant in possession cuts off the mer-
chant's power to transfer the rights of the entruster pursuant to
section 2-403(2).181 Clearly, however, the entruster's right to reclaim
the property before a subsequent purchase occurs acts as an implicit
limit on the merchant-entrustee's power to transfer all of the rights
of the entruster. Absent exercise by the owner of this right to re-
claim, however, the merchant-entrustee enjoys a variant of voidable
title, even though he may have no interest or title of his own in the
goods.
The second limit on the buyer's protection under 2-403(2) is that
his title depends on whether the entruster possesses a good title to
begin with. Unlike the voidable title portions of section 2-403, this
provisions grants the merchant the power to transfer only the rights
of the entruster. Therefore, if a thief entrusts goods, the merchant
can transfer only the void title of the thief-entruster. On the other
hand, if an entruster possesses the power to transfer a good title to
a good faith purchaser for value, the merchant to whom he entrusts
can transfer that power, but not good title itself because that power
represents all the rights the entruster has in the property.
Third, the shield afforded the buyer's property rights also is lim-
ited by his own status: unless he qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, he does not receive the protection of section 2-
403(2).111 Such a buyer approximates the good faith purchaser be-
cause both must transact in good faith and give value for what they
receive. Nevertheless, they differ significantly in several respects.
For example, pursuant to section 1-201(9), a pawnbroker never
181. Such a letter does not constitute a conditional agreement between the parties because
it occurs long after the entrusting takes place.
182. Section 1-201(9) defines the term as follows:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights
or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a
pawnbroker .... "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property
or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of
title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk
or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (emphasis supplied).
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qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business,'1 even if he
purchases in good faith and for value. In addition, a purchaser who
receives goods in satisfaction of a prior obligation can be a good faith
purchaser under 2-403(1), but not a buyer under 2-403(2). Although
the section 1-201(44) definition of "value" includes the settlement
of antecedent debts,' 4 the definition of buying in section 1-201(9)
does not encompass receiving goods as security for or in satisfaction
of a money debt.' 5
THE DIFFERING TREATMENT OF CASE I AND CASE II
Possible Policy Considerations
The drafters' decision to differentiate between noncommercial
voidable title transactions (Case I) and commercial entrusting
transactions (Case II) is not explained in the Code's comments.
Nevertheless, a study of the common law background and general
purposes of the Code suggests several possible policy considerations
underlying this differing treatment.
The common law experience demonstrates the need for clarity so
that each innocent party, understanding the rule involved and its
consequences, can modify his conduct accordingly. If, for example,
the original owner knows that he always bears the risk of theft,
fraud, or other conversion, he can modify his conduct taking precau-
tions to prevent such events, by questioning more diligently the
trustworthiness of those to whom he transfers possession of his
goods, or, if he operates a business, insuring against the expected
loss by raising the price of his merchandise to compensate. Con-
versely, if the purchaser knows that he always bears the loss, he can
alter his behavior by purchasing fewer goods in order to retain the
funds necessary to compensate himself in the event of a loss, by
inquiring more carefully into the title of his transferor, or, if he is a
merchant, he can cover the risk by increasing the price of his prod-
ucts when he resells. If, on the other hand, the rule differentiates
according to the setting of the purchase by providing that one who
purchases in a commercial transaction always acquires a good title,
the purchaser need only restrict his purchases to commercial deals
183. See note 182 supra.
184. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b).
185. See note 182 supra.
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in order to protect himself.
Other policy considerations also may have influenced the draf-
ters. The differentiation between Case I and Case II may derive from
the Code's general policy of discriminating between merchants and
nonmerchants. As they did with warranty, risk of loss, and good
faith, the drafters of the Code perhaps intended to place a heavy
burden on a merchant, whether owner or purchaser, who involved
himself in a tripartite sales transaction to the detriment of a con-
sumer. This policy, in turn, may be rooted in a desire to shift the
burden of loss to that party, either the owner or the purchaser, who
is better able to spread the risk. Additionally, the Code was de-
signed as an instrument for resolving commercial disputes, partly
through fostering the free flow of goods, which may exlain why the
owner is given more protection in noncommercial voidable title
transactions than in commercial entrusting sales. Finally, the fact
that the third sentence of section 2-403(1) was not added until many
years after the adoption of the entrusting provision may indicate a
belated attempt by the drafters to remove the impersonation dis-
tinctions, at least from the commercial context.
Achieving Code Policies
To assess the Code's effectiveness in achieving the preceding pol-
icy considerations, four factual variations are set forth. All four
variations are posed first in the context of a Case I noncommercial
sale, in which the policy of facilitating the free flow of commerce
plays no role, and then in the context of a Case II commercial
transaction.
In the first hypothetical a merchant-owner transfers to a
nonmerchant-wrongdoer, who in turn transfers to a merchant-
purchaser. Assuming section 2-403 standards are *met, the
merchant-purchaser acquires a good title. This outcome satisfies
only the first policy consideration: both the merchant-owner and the
merchant-purchaser can fashion their conduct according to a fixed,
certain outcome. Nonetheless, because both parties are merchants,
the result does not carry out the policy of forcing the merchant to
bear the risk so as to shift the burden to the party better able to
insure against loss. Moreover, if the nonmerchant-wrongdoer ob-
tains possession of the goods through an impersonation by mail and
the court applies a strict reading of section 2-403(1), the merchant-
owner wins, an outcome that fails to satisfy any of the policy consid-
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erations. The same results obtain if both the original owner and the
good faith purchaser are consumers, the second hypothetical case.
Under the third setting a nonmerchant-owner transfers to a
nonmerchant-wrongdoer, who transfers to a merchant-purchaser.
Assuming once again that the initial deal meets the requirements
of section 2-403(1), the merchant-purchaser wins, a result that car-
ries out the certainty policy. Unfortunately, the outcome does not
further the policy of forcing the merchant-litigant to bear the risk.
In addition, if the court reintroduces the impersonation distinctions
based on the owner's intent, even the certainty policy fails. Clearly,
then, in a noncommercial transaction such as this third hypotheti-
cal, satisfaction of a maximum number of policy considerations
requires the court to consider the competing equities and award title
to the nonmerchant original owner.
Fortunately, in the fourth and final hypothetical, section 2-403
satisfies all but one of its policy objectives without the need for
excessive judicial discretion. In the fourth scenerio a merchant-
owner transfers to a nonmerchant-wrongdoer, who then sells to a
nonmerchant-purchaser. Under a liberal reading of section 2-403,
the consumer-purchaser obtains title. This result correctly places
the risk of loss on the merchant-owner, an outcome both parties can
anticipate with certainty. But a strict reading of section 2-403(1)
when an impersonating agent or an impersonation by mail is in-
volved leads to a result that negates all of the policy objectives: the
merchant-owner recovers from the nonmerchant purchaser.
Some generalizations about section 2-403(1) are possible from the
foregoing analysis. First, to the extent that the impersonation dis-
tinctions have survived, section 2-403 fails to satisfy any of the listed
policies. If the drafters intended to eliminate these distinctions,
they should amend the section. Until they clarify this issue, the
transfer-of-title area remains disconcertingly confused. Second,
because section 2-403(1) was designed to deal with noncommercial
transactions,' it should provide for judicial consideration of com-
186. Warren, supra note 9, at 477-78. The author comments,
Professor Gilmore suggests that the voidable title-no title distinction developed
as a means of protecting buyers in commercial situations. If he is correct, it is
irony indeed that the role left to the voidable title concept by the Code appears
to be virtually restricted to noncommercial situations. This results from the fact
that the entrusting provisions of section 2-403(2) and (3) have swallowed up the
commercial voidable title cases where the voidable title holder is a merchant
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peting equities, such as whether either or both of the litigants are
merchants and which party is better able to spread the risk. Finally,
although section 2-403(1) presumably covers only noncommercial
voidable title controversies, a litigant who fails to meet the strict
entrusting provision requirements of section 2-403(2) may succeed
in having the court apply the section 2-403(1) voidable title theory
to his commercial transaction. For example, a pawnbroker who buys
in good faith from a merchant can argue that although he does not
qualify as a part 2 buyer in the ordinary course of business, he
satisfies the standards for a good faith purchaser for value applica-
ble to part 1. Hence, he might recover under the section 2-403 voida-
ble title provision meant for noncommercial transactions, even
though he is expressly precluded from recovering under the entrust-
ing provisions of that same section. Similarly, a purchaser who pays
by cancelling a preexisting debt, denied recovery under the entrust-
ing provision, may prevail using the voidable title clause. The draf-
ters should explain which provision governs each situation to avoid
the confusion and uncertainty of these apparent loopholes.
Case II, the commercial entrusting provision, also benefits from
an analysis of the outcome of each of the four hypotheticals. Every
case that qualifies under the entrusting clause involves a merchant
middleman; therefore, the policy of fostering the free flow of com-
merce is highly relevant in each of the following discussions. Con-
versely, the policy of eliminating the impersonation distinctions is
irrelevant because this provision applies to "[a]ny" entrusting of
possession, however induced.
The result in the first hypothetical, involving a merchant-owner
and a merchant-purchaser, satisfies the same policy objectives as
the outcome of the second hypothetical, in which both the original
owner and the subsequent purchaser qualify as nonmerchant-
consumers. In both situations the purchaser, whether a merchant or
a consumer, prevails, thereby furthering the policy of certainty as
well as the goal of facilitating commercial activity. The policy of
forcing the merchant to bear the risk is inapplicable to either hypo-
and the good faith purchaser is a buyer in ordinary course of business. Thus the
voidable title provisions of section 2-403(1) will be determinative only in cases
where the voidable title holder was not a merchant or the buyer was not a buyer
in ordinary course of business.
Id. (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
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thetical because in each the disputants enjoy the same status, be it
merchant or nonmerchant.
In the third hypothetical, in which a nonmerchant-entruster
transfers to a merchant-wrongdoer, who then transfers to a
merchant-purchaser, the purchaser again prevails. This outcome
satisfies not only the policy of predictability, but also that of foster-
ing trade, because the purchaser need not restrict his purchases to
retain funds to insure against loss. To the extent that society favors
the objective of facilitating commerce over that of forcing the mer-
chant to bear the risk of loss, this result satisfies public desires. The
wishes of the people, however, presumably are embodied in the
intent of their legislators; therefore, lawmakers should state explic-
itly which policy they favor. Unfortunately, little evidence exists of
legislative preference for any particular policy.
The fourth factual variation typifies the everyday realities of the
modern commercial setting. ' This hypothetical has a merchant-
owner entrusting goods to a merchant-wrongdoer, who then foists
them off on an unsuspecting consumer-purchaser. The purchaser
wins, and, once again, prevails in commercial transactions. The
result also encourages trade and places the burden of loss on the
party better able to insure against it. In sum, this hypothetical fits
most closely the section 2-403 scheme. Here, in reality as well as in
theory, the entrusting provision promotes all the policy objectives.
CONCLUSION
As applied in the final hypothetical, section 2-403 reflects the
realities of the marketplace and vindicates its drafters. Unfortun-
ately, not all of the intermediate-area controversies fit so neatly into
either the entrusting or the voidable title framework. The theft
cases, for example, represent an important recurring flaw in the
voidable title concept. In addition, uniform application of section
2-403 is impossible due to major, patent ambiguities that increase
the uncertainty as to which policies the drafters intended to imple-
ment. The judiciary's inconsistent application of section 2-403 to
complicated fact situations, with little or no attempt at analysis,
only increases the confusion. In the final analysis, section 2-403
187. In 88% of the cases studied, the original owner was a merchant, a university, or the
United States Government.
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needs drastic and far-reaching revision following precise enuncia-
tion of carefully considered policy objectives.
KATHERINE FEKULA JILLSON
